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Abstract: Anonymous data collection systems allow
users to contribute the data necessary to build ser-
vices and applications while preserving their privacy.
Anonymity, however, can be abused by malicious agents
aiming to subvert or to sabotage the data collection, for
instance by injecting fabricated data.
In this paper we propose an efficient mechanism to rate-
limit an attacker without compromising the privacy and
anonymity of the users contributing data. The proposed
system builds on top of Direct Anonymous Attestation,
a proven cryptographic primitive. We describe how a
set of rate-limiting rules can be formalized to define a
normative space in which messages sent by an attacker
can be linked, and consequently, dropped. We present all
components needed to build and deploy such protection
on existing data collection systems with little overhead.
Empirical evaluation yields performance up to 125 and
140 messages per second for senders and the collector
respectively on nominal hardware. Latency of communi-
cation is bound to 4 seconds in the 95th percentile when
using Tor as network layer.
Keywords: Abuse prevention, Privacy-Preserving data
collection, Data pollution, Cryptography, Direct Anony-
mous Attestation, Anonymity, Anonymous data collec-
tion
1 Introduction
It is common for a service to collect data from its users.
Be it directly, for instace by gathering book ratings to
offer recommendations on what to read next. Or indi-
rectly, by tracking the user across to serve “tailored” ad-
vertisement. Data collection is pervasive. Unfortunately,
the standard methodology of collecting data poses a se-
rious threat to the users’ privacy.
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Organizations that collect data, let us call them col-
lectors, are in general trustworthy, law abiding and with
comprehensive data management and privacy policies.
Despite good faith, collectors tend to accumulate all
user’s activity under a large profile, effectively linking all
user’s records together using an anchor. This method-
ology is problematic in regard to privacy for multiple
reasons: hacks leading to a data breach [5]; disgruntled
or unethical employees using data for their own bene-
fit [20]; companies going bankrupt and selling the data
as assets [34]; government-issued subpoenas and back-
doors [24, 31] are just some examples of the risks to
which users are exposed when large profiles exist.
To collect a single data record is not so much of a
problem with respect to privacy, but once records can be
linked to a user, serious concerns arise. Let us illustrate
it with an simple example. Three different GPS loca-
tions such as a home address, a work address and an
kindergarten address. These three location records are
innocuous in isolation, but if one knows that all three
belong to the same user it is a totally different story.
The user might be de-anonymized [10, 19, 32] and con-
sequently his full location history exposed. Privacy is
lost not by sending location records, but by the abil-
ity of the collector to link them altogether thanks to an
anchor: be it a user-id, session-id, fingerprinting, etc.
Why do organizations gather user’s data in a link-
able form? The answer to this question is out of the
scope of the paper, but experience tells us it is mostly
about convenience. Linkable data can repuposed to
serve a wide-range of different services and applications,
so it is natural to be the preferred format, despite pri-
vacy side-effects. Fortunately, this mindset is changing.
There are some examples [4, 30] of data collection sys-
tems that prevent record linkability, thus, achieving true
anonymity for users contributing data. In an anony-
mous data collection setup the collector has no
means to determine whether two records belong
to the same person.
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1.1 Problem Statement
Anonymous data collection come with the following
problem: if the user is fully anonymous, how can
the system prevent an attacker from polluting
the data collection?
This problem is not exclusive to the anonymous
data collection methodology, but it is exacerbated when
anonymity is a must.
Conventional collectors also suffer from data pol-
lution attacks, e.g. trying to alter ranking on search
engines [25], fraudulent clicking on ads [17, 18], etc.
However, in the case of conventional collectors, record-
linkage is not forbidden, as a matter of fact it is en-
couraged. User identifiers, pseudonymous or not, can be
leveraged to defend against and attacker via Authenti-
cations schemes, API keys or via statistical or machine-
learning outlier detection [8, 27] techniques.
Unfortunately, when users are truly anonymous one
cannot rely on defenses that are predicated on the abil-
ity to link records to their origin. Not being able to de-
tect attackers who take advantage of anonymity is a big
hurdle for the deployment of anonymous data collection
at scale.
1.2 Related Work
Deployed anonymous data collection systems are scarce,
we hope to witness more of them as organizations re-
evaluate their stance on the trade-off between conve-
nience and privacy.
We should emphasize the work by Anonize [26],
which focuses on providing anonymity to users fill-
ing surveys. This system allows the creation of ad-hoc
groups of users (cohorts) who can submit the same sur-
vey (data record) only once. To build on top of Anonize
we would require more flexibility for limiting the num-
ber of records a user can send. It is unclear whether
this would be achievable without modifying their pro-
tocol in a non-trivial way. The ad-hoc group selection is
also not a requirement in our case, which allows us to
save complexity.
Camenish et al. [14] presented an anonymous cre-
dential system that lets users authenticate at most n
times. This is a similar use-case as ours. We believe
this system could be adapted to fulfill our rate-limiting
needs. However, there has been many improvements
since the work was first proposed, in the current state-of-
the-art more efficient schemes exist which provide simi-
lar capabilities (e.g. relying on pairings instead of RSA).
One instance is Direct Anonymous Attestation, which
is the one we have finally chosen for our construction,
the main reasons being that it has been extensively re-
viewed, has been standardized (or is in process) and has
efficient implementations [12, 13, 29].
Note that our work does not belong to the context of
dataset anonymization, e.g. k-anonymity [35], differen-
tial privacy [22], t-closeness [33], homomorphic encryp-
tion [23], etc. The scope is not on anonymizing data
collection, but rather enabling anonymous data collec-
tion.
1.3 Contributions
In this paper we present an expressive and efficient
mechanism to limit the attackers capability to inject
fabricated data into an anonymous data collection sys-
tem, without compromising the users’ anonymity
and privacy.
There are some prior assumptions,
– We assume that the data sent by users is already
anonymous. Data records do no contain any per-
sonal identifiable information (PII) or any other el-
ement that would allow the collector to link records
coming from the same user.
– We assume that a safe anonymous communication
layer between user and collector already exists, for
example the Tor network [2].
– We assume that Sybil attacks [21] are not cost-
effective. The system presented in this paper pro-
tects against attackers controlling one (or very few)
users with valid credentials. Protection will degrade
if an attacker is able to create a large number of
sybils. We do not focus on preventing sybil attacks,
but we do take some steps to mitigate them in
Sect. 3.3.
The system that presented in this paper builds on top of
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA), a well-reviewed
cryptographic primitive. We provide a flexible way of
defining a normative space (via rate-limiting rules) that
is enforced by the controlled linkability of DAA. The end
result is that messages from attackers, who do not abide
by the defined norms, will be linkable, and consequently,
detected and dropped.
In Sect. 3 all aforementioned terms are properly de-
fined. In Sect. 3.6 we provide some descriptive high-
level examples for illustration purposes. In Sect. 4 we
describe the protocol on top of DAA. Evaluation of the
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end-to-end system performance on real users, using Tor
as anonymization network, is presented in Sect. 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall some cryptographic primitives
and notions.
Direct Anonymous Attestation
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a crypto-
graphic primitive which enables anonymous remote au-
thentication of a trusted computer. In some of its vari-
ants, it allows adding a string called basename to achieve
controlled linkability. Under this definition, two mes-
sages signed by the same user will be unlinkable if and
only if their basename is different.
We want to emphasize the importance of the base-
name concept: this is the key idea that will allow us
to achieve protection via rate-limiting in an anonymous
way. How to use signatures and basenames to prevent
data collection attacks will be detailed in section 3.
Let us introduce the Direct Anonymous Attestation
(DAA) algorithms as defined in [12] to offer an overview
of the operations relevant for the purposes of our sys-
tem:
Setup: A randomized algorithm that produces a
pair (gpk, isk), where gpk is the group public key and
isk the issuer secret key.
Join: An interactive protocol run between a signer
and an issuer I. At the end of the protocol, signer ob-
tains a secret key usk and membership credential ucred
issued by I.
Sign: On input of gpk, usk, ucred, a basename bsn,
and a message m, the signer uses this algorithm to pro-
duce a signature σ on m under (usk, ucred). The base-
name bsn is a string used to control the linkability.
Verify: On input of gpk, bsn, m, a signature σ on
m, a verifier uses this algorithm to determine whether
σ is valid.
Link: On input of two signatures σ1 and σ2, a veri-
fier uses this algorithm to determine whether the signa-
tures are linked, unlinked or invalid.
For efficiency purposes, we require an additional
ExtractTag algorithm, such that for two valid signa-
tures σ1 and σ2:
Link(σ1, σ2) = linked ⇐⇒
ExtractT ag(σ1) = ExtractT ag(σ2)
It is important to remark that we do not consider
a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that can be used to
prove authorization to the issuer. Instead, we will as-
sume that this authentication can be achieved via some
long-lived keypair, which would serve as the user iden-
tity.
Besides, we have to note that contrary to a DAA
scheme, we do not specify that the basename bsn has
to be either a special symbol or the name string of an
issuer. Instead we will use the basename to define the
rate limits that construct the normative space, as we
will show in the following sections.
Format-preserving encryption
Format-preserving encryption [11] allows encrypting in
such a way that the ciphertext is in the same format
as the plaintext. This means, for example, that if the
plaintext is a always an integer between 0 and N - 1,
then the ciphertext will also be.
For our purposes, we will define FPEN (key, value) →
{0, . . . , N − 1} , key ∈ {0, 1}τ , 0 ≤ value < N as a func-
tion that encrypts an integer value preserving its for-
mat. We will also assume that that the computation
time for a single value FPEN (key, value) is constant.
Under this definition, we can use FPEN and a fixed
random key to generate a pseudo-random permuta-
tion of {0, . . . , N − 1} by encrypting all possible values:(
FPEN (key, 0),FPEN (key, 1), . . . ,FPEN (key,N − 1)
)
.
3 Design
In this section we present the design of our system. By
employing an anonymous credential system based on
DAA, and its controlled linkability features, we will be
able to detect and filter out messages from users who
are not normative, i.e. that have exceeded the assigned
quota.
In order to better understand the problem, let us
consider three actors: a Client, which executes in a user
machine (e.g. a browser), a Collector, some service that
needs to receive some data from clients, and the Verifier,
responsible to decide, for each input message, whether
it is valid (and forward it to the collector) or not (drop
it). The Verifier and Collector can be the same entity.
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For a message to be framed as valid by the collector
we want to impose several conditions:
1. Message is well-formed: it must belong to the set of
valid messages as defined by the concrete system.
In practice, this is equivalent to the server-side val-
idation that most services do on user input data.
2. User sending the message is authorized: has pos-
session of some credentials that we have explicitly
allowed.
3. The message does not exceed some defined user
quota.
These conditions are straightforward to enforce if pri-
vacy preservation is not a requirement. For example, by
forcing the user to attach his identity (public key) and a
signature to every message the collector would be able
to keep track of the full history of messages for every
user. This way, doing any arbitrarily complex per-user
rate-limiting would be a trivial task.
But we want achieve these goals in a privacy pre-
serving way. We will show it is possible to do so by using
a Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) cryptographic
primitive.
Just by directly employing DAA we can already ful-
fill one of the conditions we wanted to enforce: ensur-
ing that every message was sent by an authorized user,
anonymously.
However, if an authorized user decides to subvert
the system in some way and start sending malicious
messages, it would still be impossible to detect, pre-
cisely because of the anonymity of the authentication
system. Therefore, we want to be able to further limit
the capabilities of users even if they are authorized.
Fortunately, DAA also allows controlled linkability
via a basename string (bsn) that can be attached to
a signature. More concretely, two messages signed with
the same user credentials will be unlinkable if and only
if their basenames are different. This feature can be in-
strumented to ensure that authorized users abide by
some defined rules when sending messages to the collec-
tor.
We will present several ideas on how the structure of
these basenames can be defined to achieve common rate-
limiting patterns. We will proceed in an incremental
fashion, starting with the simplest structure and mov-
ing step by step to achieve more expressive rate-limiting
rules. Our final general construction will serve as a for-
malization for the concept of rate-limiting ruleset. At
a high level view, each of these final rules will comprise
three dimensions:
1. A component that depends on the message content,
called the digest.
2. A monitoring period K, meaning that the rule
will be reset every K units of time.
3. A multiplier N , meaning that for any other fixed
two dimensions the user will be able to send N mes-
sages.
3.1 Rate-limiting rules construction
3.1.1 N-times anonymous authentication
Consider the following structure for a basename:
bsn← 〈nonce〉 , 0 ≤ nonce < N,N ∈ N
With these constraints in place there are only N
possible distinct basenames that a user can construct.
If a user sends N + 1 messages then two of them must
use the same basename and therefore will be linkable
by the collector. This allows us to easily filter out these
extra non-allowed messages, effectively enforcing a sim-
ple rate-limiting rule that caps the number of messages
an authorized user will be able to send.
While this can be useful in some cases, we would
like to achieve more expressiveness in our rate-limiting
rules.
3.1.2 Limiting by time period
A reasonable extension to the previous scheme is to in-
clude a timestamp with specific resolution to the base-
name:
〈⌊
time
K
⌋
, nonce
〉
, 0 ≤ nonce < N
Here time would be an integer indicating when the
user sent the message and K would be the monitoring
period, in the same units as the time (chosen depending
on the application, e.g. hours). This limits the amount
of messages a user can send to N every K units of time,
which is slightly more general than the case seen in 3.1.1.
3.1.3 Message-specific rate-limiting
In order to achieve even more expressive power, we want
to make the rate-limiting logic message specific. Besides,
we would like to be able to enforce more than one rule
at the same time. For example, we might want to have
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a rule to limit to Nday the total number of messages a
user can send per day and at the same time another rule
that limits sending a specific class of message to Nclass
every hour.
We can use the same DAA primitive to achieve this
by attaching more than one signature per message, each
one with a different basename, corresponding to each
rate-limiting rule. Taking this into consideration, the
final construction for the basenames would be as follows:
bsni ←
〈
digesti(m),
⌊
time
FKi(m)
⌋
, noncei
〉
0 ≤ noncei < FNi(m)
Note that by replacing the N and K constants by
functions FN and FK we allow the limits to depend
arbitrarily on the message (based on content, type, etc.).
Additionally, the digest function allows the possibility
for parts of the message content to be part of the rate-
limiting rules.
By allowing multiple basenames we can effectively
enforce several rules at the same time if required. Fur-
thermore, we do not lose generality: we can still create
rules with the semantics of sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, by
making the digesti return a constant and making FKi
return a very high number, so that the time component
of the basename never changes.
We can finally model our rate-limiting
rules as a list of triples of functions:
(digest1,FN1,FK1), . . . , (digestn,FNn,FKn).
We refer to section 3.6 for practical examples that
make use of the possibilities that these general rate-
limiting rules offer.
3.2 Choosing the nonce
Let us define a pre-basename as a basename with all
fixed components except the nonce. How to choose a
fresh nonce will depend on two factors: how many times
that pre-basename has already been used and the spe-
cific rule limit FNi(m).
A user should never send two messages with the
same basename, otherwise they will be linked and
blocked. Therefore, some state will need to be main-
tained so that a client can efficiently choose a ran-
dom nonce from the unused ones, or abort if it has ex-
ceeded some quota. Note that it is important that for
a given pre-basename, the sequence of nonces that the
user selects is indeed random, to minimize the amount
of information that a collector might have to attempt
deanonymization.
By using Format-preserving encryption we can
achieve this in constant time (per message) and space.
We only need to store a random key and the number n
of messages that have already been sent, for every pre-
basename. Then, in order to pick a fresh nonce it suffices
to perform FPE encryption with the corresponding key
and n, and then increment n for the corresponding pre-
basename in the user storage, so that we can efficiently
mark the nonce as used.
3.3 User identities and key rotation
If we recall the Join protocol in DAA, the Issuer can
communicate with a TPM to verify that the signer plat-
form is entitled to receive anonymous credentials (join
the group).
We do not consider a TPM and therefore the prob-
lem of verifying user identities in the join operation
becomes slightly more complex. We assume the exis-
tence of some long-lived public key (e.g. RSA, ECDSA,
EdDSA,...) that serves as user identity, proven via sig-
nature. Depending on the use case, it might be possible
to additionally require stronger means of identification,
such as e-mail, mobile number, social security numbers,
or even proof of work [9], etc. The more difficult to gen-
erate or counterfeit, the better, since it will increase the
cost of creating artificial users. It seems reasonable to
assume that it will always be feasible for attackers to
create multiple identities to gain an advantage for in-
jecting malicious data (Sybil attack). We do not claim to
avoid these attacks, but we take some reasonable steps
in order to mitigate them.
First, we perform periodic Issuer key rotation,
forcing users to obtain new credentials every so often.
Then, we try to make it difficult for an attacker with
many identities to renew credentials for all of them. In
other words: we try to make it difficult to Join multiple
times for an attacker. Note that the latter mechanism
cannot be effective without the first one, otherwise an
attacker would join once and then be able to send mes-
sages forever without additional effort.
Note that the Join operation does not need to be
network-anonymized, the Issuer needs to see the long
lived user public key, which is a stronger identifier than
the IP address. Taking this into consideration we can
leverage on the literature for anomaly and outlier de-
tection. The difference is that we would not apply the
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detection methods on the data itself but on the Join
operation. So anonymity of data is not compromised.
A side-effect of doing periodical key rotation is that
both the user and the verifier can empty their stored
pre-basenames or tags. This is so because it is ensured
that different user private keys and user credentials will
always produce different (unlinkable) signatures, even
for identical basenames. This fact also has an important
practical implication that must be taken into consider-
ation: the rate-limiting ruleset can only be enforced
for as long as the group public key, and the correspond-
ing user credentials, are valid. Therefore, in practice we
should avoid rules with monitoring periods larger than
the group public key life. This especially relevant for
rules with no time component (or infinite monitoring
period), like the ones we present in the example 3.1.1.
In general, whenever we allow key rotation there should
always be some monitoring period in the rules, and this
should be smaller than the group public key life.
3.4 Possible de-anonymization attacks
We discuss two possible de-anonymization attacks by
the Issuer with the same vector: artificially reduce the
number of members in a group. In the extreme case, a
group could have a single user, then the collector could
safely assume that all data receive comes from the same
user.
Note that these attacks assume collusion between
the collector receiving the data and the Issuer; it is not
necessary that both entities are controlled by the same
organization, they could be decoupled for extra safety.
However, in practical terms it is unlikely that they are
provably independent.
Ephemeral group public keys
In our design we assume that group public keys can be
rotated periodically by the Issuer, therefore there must
be a way for a user to dynamically query the Issuer for
the current valid group key, and possibly some of the
next ones.
A possible attack that could be done by a malicious
Issuer would consist in showing different group public
keys to different users. In other words: trying to create
many smaller groups to make de-anonymization easier.
Since the retrieval of the group public keys is anony-
mous there is no way for an Issuer to target specific
users. Therefore, the only possibility would be to change
the announced group public keys randomly, hoping that
signers would not notice. Fortunately, this is easy to de-
tect by a user: we can retrieve group public keys from
the Issuer periodically and make sure they were not
changed unexpectedly (before the announced expiration
time). As an additional guarantee, in such case an at-
tack was detected a signer could punish the collector
service in some way, for example by stopping all data
collection.
Denying user group join
Another possible de-anonymization attack would con-
sist in only allowing specific users to join a group. Be-
cause the join operation is not anonymous, it requires
user identifying information (e.g. a long-lived public
key), this attack can be used to target a specific user
or subset of users.
The attack, however, comes with the cost of stop-
ping all data collection from users that were denied to
join the group. In the case of targeting a single user, the
collector would stop receiving data from everybody ex-
cept the targeted user. Let us emphasize that the Issuer
can deny a group join, but the user can verify whether
he joined or not (see Sect. A.2). In the case of join denial
users are expected to stop sending data.
This attack cannot be prevented by design. How-
ever, the attack is extremely costly, tracking a user
would imply losing all data from the rest of the users.
Additionally, if sustained over a long period of time the
attack might be noticed by users as some might publicly
report the persisting failure to join.
3.5 Unlinkability guarantees
The standard notion of unlinkability in the Direct
Anonymous Attestation setting requires that given a
signature the probability that it belongs to a particular
user must be equal for all the users.
With the proposed usage of the DAA basenames it
is clear that our scheme does not fulfill this definition.
First, if we find two unlinkable messages signed under
the same basename we know for sure they were signed
by different users. Second, users keep some local state
(the set of already used basenames) which might be par-
tially leaked to the collector. For example, if a user can
send 100 messages (by choosing an unused nonce from
0 to 99), after enough nonces have been spent the pos-
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sibilities for the remaining choices are reduced and the
sequence of nonces might be predictable.
Still, if the amount of users contributing is large
(e.g. tens of thousands), it is unfeasible to link messages
from honest users with the proposed scheme. We do not
foresee how the small amount of information that the
collector can learn could be exploited.
3.6 Examples
Let us present some practical cases to illustrate how
our system, via concrete rate-limiting rules definitions,
can be used to prevent an attack. Whenever we men-
tion basenames and rate-limiting rules, we refer to the
formalization presented in Sect. 3.1.3.
3.6.1 GPS Location
Suppose a location heatmap service that requires users
to send their GPS position once in a 5 minutes interval.
Let us call this service heatmap-service-1.
Because the collector wants to respect the privacy
of the users contributing data, the message must not
contain PII, uids or any other element that would allow
to build a session for a particular user. Messages could
be sent through Tor to remove network-level identifiers.
A privacy-preserving message could look like this1:
m = {
latitute: 48.85034,
longitude: 2.294694,
timestamp: "2018/02/12T12:23",
service: "heatmap-service-1"
}
The collector should have means of knowing which
user is sending the message m. Therefore, an attacker
could create thousands of messages to disrupt the ser-
vice. To deter such an attack we must decide which rate-
limiting we want to apply. In this case, let us assume we
want to limit the number of messages per user to 1 every
5 minutes interval.
1 Note that sampling often with high resolution in area with few
users would allow for probabilistic linkage of records. Avoiding
implicit linkage by the message (record) content is not an easy
task, as discussed at length in [30].
Formalizing it into a set of rate-limiting rules, and
assuming the time units are in minutes, would result
into one rule
digest1(m) = heatmap-service-1
FK1(m) = 5
FN1(m) = 1
which when applied to the given sample could give
as a result the following basename:
bsn1 = 〈heatmap-service-1, 2018/02/12T12:20, 0〉
where heatmap-service-1 is the result of the di-
gest of the message (always constant in this case) and
2018/02/12T12:20 is the time rounded to 5 minute res-
olution (formatted for readability). The nonce is set to
0 as it does not apply in this scenario since N = 1, i.e.
1 message per time period.
Note that our system does not aim to prevent an
attacker sending bogus latitude and longitude. The goal
is to ensure that the attacker will be only able to inject
one bogus message every 5 minutes interval at best.
3.6.2 Surveys
This examples illustrates how we can set the rules to
allow users to send anonymous surveys while ensuring
each user can only submit a valid answer once. Anon-
ize [26] was designed to support this kind of use-cases
(among other more elaborate). The message to be sent
by users could look like this,
m = {
survey_id: "34ef2a",
survey_data: {
...
},
timestamp: "2018/02/12T12:23",
service: "survey-service-1"
}
We want to enforce that each user can only send
the survey once. The rate-limiting rules for this use-
case have no temporal aspect at all. To achieve this
within the general ruleset framework from 3.1.3 we can
set FK to return a very large constant, so that
⌊
time
FK(m)
⌋
is always 0 in practice. The concrete rules would be
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digest1(m) = survey-service-1|m.surveyid
FK1(m) = 2
50
FN1(m) = 1
which applied to the sample message would result
in
bsn1 = 〈survey-service-1 | 34ef2a, 0, 0〉
We have chosen this example to showcase the sce-
nario where only one message (the survery response) is
needed. However, as we discussed in 3.3, even if we want
a rule which is unlimited in time, there will always be
an implicit temporal limitation given by the group and
user key rotation, after which theoretically the users will
be able send messages again, since they will start with
a fresh quota. Therefore, we should make a survey only
be valid during a time span less than the duration of
the group public key for which the messages have to
be signed. Otherwise, the group key could rotate in the
middle of a survey and a user could send a survey re-
sponse twice and still be considered honest under our
rule definition.
3.6.3 Query Logs
The last example showcases a more complex case com-
posed by multiple rate-limiting rules. Let us suppose we
want to collect query-log pairs from users in order to im-
prove the ranking of a search engine. This particular use
case is vital for the proper functioning of Cliqz’s search
engine. The messages sent by users could look like this:
m = {
query: "hotel paris",
landing_url: "https://www.booking.com/
city/fr/paris.htm",
timestamp: "2018/02/12T12:23",
}
In this case, we want to enforce two rules at the
same time:
1. A user can only contribute 5 queries per day.
2. For a specific query q a user can only send a message
once per day.
This can be translated into the following rate-limiting
ruleset, again assuming the time units are in minutes:
digest1(m) = query-log-service-1
FK1(m) = 24 · 60
FN1(m) = 5
digest2(m) = query-log-service-2|normalize(m.query)
FK2(m) = 24 · 60
FN2(m) = 1
Applying both rules defined to the sample message
could lead to something like:
bsn1 = 〈ql-service-1, 2018/02/12, 3〉
bsn2 = 〈ql-service-2 | hotel paris, 2018/02/12, 0〉
For the first rule we have a fixed digest and a date,
and the nonce can be chosen between 0 and 4. For the
second rule, the digest depends on the normalized query
in the message and in this case the nonce can only be 0.
Note that the digests of the rules have different static
prefixes to avoid possible collisions.
They user would sign the message twice, once for
each basename, and send it to the collector. After send-
ing the message (assuming it is the first in the day) the
user would still be able to send more messages for that
day, 4 more, but not for the same query.
In order for these rules to be completely effec-
tive, the normalization applied in the digest function
of the second rule should make sure that an attacker
cannot use variations of a query to obtain different
basenames for what it is esentially the same query.
For instance, queries like hotels in paris, hotel on
paris, HoteL IN PARIS, hotels␣␣␣␣in paris, etc.
should all get normalized to the same digest2. This
kind of attacks are use-case specific, as a rule-of-thumb,
a designer should make sure that digests do not contain
data that has not been sanitized and normalized.
4 Protocol
In this section we specify the protocol taking into con-
sideration the concepts presented in the previous sec-
tion. More specifically, we construct the basenames
2 We can apply known transformations on the query like down-
casing, trim spaces, bag-of-words, stemming, etc.
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for rate-limiting rules as specified in 3.1.3, select the
nonces and store related needed information as dis-
cussed in 3.2, and include operations for dynamic group
and user key rotation as seen in 3.3.
For our protocol we use DAA as a cryptographic
primitive, but without a TPM for the Join operation.
We base our implementation on the concrete scheme
presented in [13], which is at the same time based
on [15].
Whenever we mention the operations Setup, Join,
Sign, Verify or ExtractTag we are referring to the
concrete DAA scheme operations, described in Annex A.
However, any DAA implementation that follows the se-
mantics described in Sect. 2 might be used while keeping
the same security and anonymity guarantees.
Before describing the protocol in detail, it is impor-
tant to clarify the entities or actors that we consider in
our system and how do they map to the entities in a
DAA scheme,
– Signer, User or Client: in our system this is any
entity that sends data to a Collector, and corre-
sponds to the Signer in DAA.
– Issuer: this corresponds to the Issuer in DAA.
– Verifier or Collector: in our system this is the
entity that must verify the messages and decide
whether they are valid or not.
RefreshGroupPublicKeys
This operation is executed periodically by the user, to
make sure the group public keys are still valid. The user
should not send any message if the group public keys
have expired.
– User anonymously requests to Issuer the list of
group public keys.
– Issuer returns a list of group public keys and time-
to-live pairs (gpk0, expiry0), (gpk1, expiry1), . . .,
(gpkn, expiryn), where gpk0 and expiry0 are the cur-
rently valid group public key and its expiration date,
respectively, and the rest the n next group public
keys, ordered by increasing expiration.
– User checks whether the list is consistent with pre-
viously stored information (Issuer has not changed
any key before the announced expiration). If there
was some unexpected change, punish the collec-
tion process as defined in the concrete system and
abort. (See attack in 3.4).
– User stores the retrieved list.
– User executes ObtainCredentials on all the group
public keys for which still does not have credentials.
ObtainCredentials
– User executes the Join protocol with the issuer and
a specific group public key gpk to obtain credentials
valid for that public key: (usk, ucred) ← Join(gpk)
– User stores the credentials CREDSu[gpk] ←
(usk, ucred)
RotateUserKeys
This operation is executed periodically by the user.
– If expiry0 < current_time then abort.
– User replaces its current credentials for the ones
of the new valid group public key (usk, ucred) ←
CREDSu[gpk1].
– User invalidates the stored tags: TAGSu ← ∅
RotateIssuerKeys
This operation is executed periodically by the issuer.
– If expiry0 < current_time then abort.
– Issuer executes (gsk, isk) ← Setup(), stores
(gsk, isk) and appends (gpk, expiry) to the end of
the public list.
– Issuer rotates the public list (gski, expiryi) ←
(gski+1, expiryi+1).
– Issuer notifies the verifier of the new group key.
– Verifier checks if the new gpk is different from the
previous one, and if so it invalidates its stored tags:
TAGSv ← ∅
SendMessage
Input: a message m, user private key usk,
user credentials ucred and n rate-limiting rules
(digest1, FN1, FK1), ..., (digestn, FNn, FKn).
User
– User executes RefreshGroupPublicKeys if
expiration0 ≥ current_time.
– User waits a reasonable randomized amount of time
if some protocol operation was executed recently, in-
cluding SendMessage, to avoid possible time cor-
relations.
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– User computes n pre-basenames on the message
(all the components except the nonce). prebsni ←〈
digesti(m),
⌊
time
FKi(m)
⌋〉
.
– User does a storage look-up for every prebsni:
(keyi, ni) ← TAGSu[prebsni]. If it does not exist,
initializes: TAGSu[prebsni] ←
(
keyi
$
←− {0, 1}τ , 0
)
.
If some ni ≥ FNi(m) then abort.
– User uses format-preserving encryption to create a
fresh nonce for every pre-basename as noncei ←
FPEFNi(m)(keyi, ni) and builds the basename as
bsni ←
〈
digesti(m),
⌊
time
FKi(m)
⌋
, noncei
〉
– User increments the nonce for every stored pre-
basename: TAGSu[prebsni] ← (keyi, ni + 1)
– User produces n signatures on m: σi ←
Sign(usk, ucred,m, bsni)
– User sends (m,σ1, . . . , σn, bsn1, . . . , bsnn) to the ver-
ifier via an anonymous communication channel.
Verifier
– Verifier checks that the all the basenames bsni are
correctly computed based on the message and the
current time. If some is not abort.
– Verifier checks validity of the signatures: if any
V erify(gpk,m, bsni, σi) returns false then abort.
– Verifier extracts the linkability tag for every sig-
nature tagi ← ExtractT ag(σi). If some tagi is
present in TAGSv then abort.
– Verifier inserts the all the tags in the storage:
TAGSv ← TAGSv ∪ tagi.
– Verifier accepts the message.
5 Implementation
5.1 Library
For the implementation of our protocol we have used the
Apache Milagro Crypto Library [1]. It is a self-contained,
standalone library. We found the implemented opera-
tions fast enough for our purposes, so we did not look
for other libraries. The library is implemented in C, and
for our protocol we have chosen the same language.
For evaluating our system we have considered a
server for the verifier/issuer part and a browser for the
client, and ported the code to these platforms. For the
server side we have built a Node.js [36] module via C
bindings. For the browser, thanks to Emscripten [38]
we have been able to compile the same protocol code
to WebAssembly, achieving performance comparable to
the native version. In Sect. 6 we show some benchmark
figures.
The code of the implemented Direct Anonymous At-
testation primitives has been open-sourced [3].
5.2 Network anonymity
In the introduction (Sect. 1.3) we made the assump-
tion that network anonymity is provided externally in
some way, typically via a trusted VPN partner or some
anonymity network like Tor.
For benchmarking our implementation we have cho-
sen the latter. It provides better anonymity guarantees
since nodes are under the control of many different or-
ganizations, so there is no single point of failure with
regard to trust. Note that Tor, as any other system, is
not free from de-anonymization attempts [28, 37].
Using Tor, however, implies that users should be
running the Tor client on their devices, which is not a
very realistic assumption for general users. To overcome
users not running a native Tor client we ported it [7] to
WebAssembly, in a similar way as we did for the protocol
implementation. This ensures that the Tor client logic
(cryptographic operations, etc.) can be run in a browser.
However, in some contexts in which this WebAssembly
Tor version could be used (web pages, browser exten-
sions) it is not possible to create raw TCP sockets as
required by the native Tor client. In order to solve this
issue we have setup a Tor bridge and a WebSocket server
adapter that proxies incoming WebSocket traffic to the
internal Tor bridge. On the browser side, we setup the
Tor client to use our bridge, and use WebSockets to be
able to communicate to the real Tor bridge. We believe
this scenario should be equivalent to a native Tor client
connecting to a Tor bridge via a WebSocket pluggable
transport.
It is important to note that in the described setup
the same organization would be in control of both the
entry point (WebSocket Tor bridge) and the final des-
tination of the data. This would allow for trivial corre-
lation attacks, and result in no provable anonymization
of the users. For that reason, we also tested the system
with a WebSocket Tor Bridge ran by a third party. Co-
incidence or not, such bridge was already deployed as
part of the Snowflake [6] pluggable transport project at
Tor: all we needed was to replace our bridge address by
the Snowflake one.
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Let us remark that this approach is completely ex-
perimental and would need to be reviewed and audited
before completely relying on its security and anonymity
guarantees. Besides, it might be difficult in practice to
find a suitable third-party WebSocket bridge. For ex-
ample, it is unclear if it would be acceptable to use the
mentioned Snowflake proxy, since it might put it under
a load it was not prepared to handle.
Even with these concerns, we believe it might be an
interesting option to explore in order to achieve network
anonymity in a restricted environment like a browser
extension or just regular web pages.
6 Evaluation
In this section we provide benchmarks for the protocol
needed to guarantee protection against attackers (de-
scribed in Sect. 4). We would like to stress that system
presented in this paper is in production, supporting the
anonymous data collection effort of few million users.
The experimental setup is as follows:
– Issuer publishes group keys every 3 days.
– Clients fetch user credentials once every 3 days via
Join protocol.
– Sign the messages using credentials fetched in the
earlier step.
– Use Tor as the network layer for fetching the cre-
dentials and sending signed messages.
– Fixed payload sizes for request / response as shown
in Table 3.
Table 1 and 2 summarize the time overhead for client
(users) and server (collector) respectively. The time is
the average in milliseconds for different protocol opera-
tions. Network overhead is not considered.
For the client, the most expensive operation is Join
which takes about 20ms, but it only runs once every 3
days.
Table 1. Average time spent on client-side operations. Also com-
pares a native implementation of the client. Network overhead is
not taken into account.
Operation Webassembly (ms) Native (ms)
Join Group 20 8.5
Sign message 5 0.4
For the server-side, the most expensive operation is
Verify, which takes about 6.8ms per message per core
on nominal hardware. This sets the throughput of the
collector to approximately 150 messages per second per
core, which is more than enough for our workload, we
collect an average of 3 to 4 messages per minute per
user.
Note that verification does not need to be syn-
chronous, a setup with queues, with high priority lanes
if needed, will further help scalability.
Table 2. Average time spent on server-side operations. Network
overhead is not taken into account.
Operation Time spent (ms)
Generate group keys 2.3
Generate credentials 1.6
Verify message 6.8
The implementation on both server and client takes
care of padding the messages to fixed sizes in order
to prevent fingerprinting by measuring payload sizes.
Table 3 shows the size of the payload at each step of
request-response.
Table 3. Payload sizes
Operation Request size (KB) Response size (KB)
Fetch group keys – 5.04
Fetch credentials 0.95 0.477
Signed Message 16.384 0.021
Based on these payload sizes, Table 4 compares the
95th percentile network latency when communicating
with end-points without Tor, with end-points over Tor,
end-points as onion services.
Table 4. Comparison of 95th percentile network latency for Send
message operation using Tor network.
Setup Latency (seconds)
Without Tor 0.229
With Tor and endpoints as normal services 3.25
With Tor and endpoints as onion services 2.57
Although the evaluation shows that latency in-
creases 10x when communication is through Tor, is a
very good trade-off taking into consideration the bene-
fits it provides. Also, latency overhead is only important
for synchronous communication, which is rarely the case
for data collection.
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7 Conclusions
We have presented a system to effectively and effi-
ciently prevent attackers from polluting data collection
by abusing the anonymity that guarantees the users’
privacy.
Thanks to the presented system a collector can de-
fine a normative space, which is enforced cryptographi-
cally using Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA): any
message that infringes any of the defined rate-limiting
rules can be detected, and consequently, dropped. The
anonymity of users sending data is preserved at all
times.
The normative space defined by the collector has a
set of rate-limiting rules on multiple dimensions: time,
content and multipliers, so that a wide-range of use-
cases can be accommodated. For instance, a collector
could require that record of type x can be sent once per
hour, and that records of type y can be sent 5 times a
day if an only if its content matches a certain pattern.
The defined rate-limiting rules can be formally mapped
to a basename on DAA, which will offer the required
cryptographic guarantees.
We also present a description of all components
needed to implement and deploy the system, including
an evaluation of its performance.
We hope that this work will help those organiza-
tions hesitant to use anonymous data collection beca-
sue of potential data pollution. We demonstrate that is
possible defend against adversarial attacks while main-
taining anonymity, and consequently, privacy. Protec-
tion against sybil attacks is limited to the difficulty of
creating/renewing identities, which is domain specific.
Protection against single identities, however, is entirely
covered.
We believe that our contribution demonstrates the
feasibility of deploying anonymous data collection sys-
tems. Once the fear of data pollution is out of the pic-
ture, there is no reason to not collect the data anony-
mously, unless, of course, convenience is more valued
than the users’ privacy.
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A Concrete DAA scheme
A.1 Preliminaries
Bilinear Maps
Let G1, G2 and GT be a bilinear group of prime order q
with generators g1, g2, e : G1×G2 → GT a bilinear map
and H1 : {0, 1}
∗ → G1, H : {0, 1}
∗ → Zq cryptographic
hash functions.
Signatures of Knowledge
A zero-knowledge proof is a method by which one party
(prover) can convince another party (verifier) that a
statement is true, without disclosing any information
apart from that fact.
We will use the definitions and notation introduced
by Camenisch and Stadler [16] to present the concept
of Signatures of Knowledge, which are based on zero-
knowledge proofs.
Let us introduce the notation
SPK{(x) : y = gx}(m)
denoting a signature of knowledge of the discrete log-
arithm of y on the message m. This signature can be
computed if the secret key x = logg(y) is known, by
choosing r at random from Zq and computing c and s
according to
c← H(m||y||g||gr) and s← r − cx mod q
A valid signature will satisfy
c = H(m||y||g||gsyc)
Note that x is not revealed, the proof itself just con-
sists of the pair (c, s). The elements y, g and m are con-
sidered public.
A variant which we will also employ is the following,
proving the equality of the logarithm of two elements:
SPK{(x) : y = ax ∧ z = bx}(m)
where a and b are generators of G. Again this can be
computed with knowledge of x, by choosing r at random
from Zq and computing c and s according to
c← H(m||y||z||a||b||ar||br) and s← r−cx mod q
Here a valid signature will satisfy
c = H(m||y||z||a||b||asyc||bszc)
These two types of signatures of knowledge (or zero-
knowledge proofs) will suffice for the protocol.
A.2 Scheme
We use the scheme described in [13], which is at the
same time based on [15].
Setup
Used by the issuer to create a key pair of the CL-
signature scheme.
– Choose x, y
$
←− Zq, and set X ← g
x
2 , Y ← g
y
2 .
– Compute the proof: pi
$
←− SPK {(x, y) : X = gx2 ∧ Y = g
y
2}.
– Output a key pair as 〈isk = (x, y), gpk = (X,Y, pi)〉
where isk is the issuer secret key and gpk the cor-
responding group public key.
Join
User authenticates with her long lived PKI (upk, usk)
and, if the issuer allows, obtains a credential that sub-
sequently enables the user to create signatures.
User
– Choose gsk
$
←− Zq.
– Compute c← H(X,Y, pi, upk)
– Set Q = ggsk1 and compute pi1
$
←−
SPK
{
(gsk) : Q = ggsk1
}
(c)
– Store gsk and send msgjoin ← (upk, Q, pi1) and
sigmsg ← sign(msgjoin, usk) to the issuing service.
Issuer
– Set (x, y) ← isk and (X,Y ) ← gpk.
– Verify pi1, the signature sigmsg and check whether
user upk is registered.
– If there are stored (previously generated) credentials
for upk, and user is not allowed to get new ones, send
those to the user. Otherwise:
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– Choose r
$
←− Zq and compute a ← g
r
1 , b ← a
y, c ←
ax ·Qrxy, d← Qry.
– Compute pi2
$
←− SPK
{
(t) : b = gt1 ∧ d = Q
t
}
– Store the credentials for user upk as (a, b, c, d, pi2).
– Transmit credentials to user.
User
– Verify pi2.
– Verify the credentials as a 6= 1, e(a, Y ) = e(b, g2),
and e(c, g2) = e(a · d,X).
– Complete the join by appending (a, b, c, d) to the
already stored gsk.
Sign
Input: user secret key gsk, user credentials (a, b, c, d), a
basename bsn, and a message m.
– Choose r
$
←− Zq and set (a
′, b′, c′, d′) ←
(ar, br, cr , dr).
– Compute pi
$
←− SPK{(gsk) : tag = H1(bsn)
gsk∧d′ =
b′gsk}(m, bsn).
– The signature is σ ← (a′, b′, c′, d′, pi, tag).
Verify
Input: user secret key gpk, a basename bsn, a message
m and a candidate signature σ.
– Parse σ as (a, b, c, d, pi, tag).
– Verify pi with respect to (m, bsn).
– Check a 6= 1, e(a, Y ) = e(b, g2), and e(c, g2) = e(a ·
d,X).
– Accept signature as valid.
ExtractTag
Input: a valid signature σ.
– Parse σ as (a, b, c, d, pi, tag)
– Return tag
